Oliver Rathkolb
Notes on the “Denazification”¹

The most distinctive example of the insurmountable conflict of priorities in cultural denazification – namely the demand of artistic performance while simultaneously eliminating National Socialist thought by rigorous personnel cleansing – was represented by the political classification of a collective orchestra such as the Vienna Philharmonic. While especially British and US-American cultural affairs officers initially had clear instructions and various “black lists” for individual cultural performers to prevent all artists charged with National Socialism from public appearance – in order to completely eliminate National Socialist ideology by means of a kind of “cool down” period and an eventual “exchange of elites” – they could not assert themselves with this orchestra. The Vienna Philharmonic formed a unified orchestra that was well-known internationally and especially in Europe, but at the same time had the “technical” drawback of a disproportionately high rate of former National Socialist party members – amongst them numerous “illegals” (Illegale, i.e. party members during the party ban 1933-1938). Such a difficulty was not presented to the Americans in the former Reich capital Berlin: There, only 20 of around 110 musicians had belonged to the NSDAP.² By comparison, in the beginning of 1943, out of 123 Philharmonic in Vienna, 60 or about 50% had belonged to the NSDAP;³ at least 22 of these in turn were “illegals,” and two were members of the Schutzstaffel (SS).⁴

First tangible contact with US cultural affairs officers was made in September 1945, when contact talks about the Philharmonic were held with the provisional leader of the Philharmonic, Fritz Sedlak, and the director of the Vienna State Opera.⁵ There had originally been rumours that 70 to 85% of the orchestral members were supposed to have been NSDAP-members, but Sedlak claimed that out of 135 members of the State Opera orchestra – not all orchestral musicians of the State Opera are automatically also members of the Vienna Philharmonic – only 34 had been party members.⁶ Also, in their struggle against a

⁵ National Archives, College Park, Maryland (=NA), Record Group(=RG) 260/35/Folder: Theatre & Music Section, Otto de Pasetti – Vienna activities report, September 13 and 14, 1945, 2.
⁶ Ibid.
further denazification of the orchestra, the musicians attempted to win the Americans over with the help of the opera’s administrative director, Matthäus Flitsch.\(^7\)

A special characteristic in the negotiations with the concert master of the Philharmonic was that the US cultural affairs officer, Otte de Pasetti, who as the life partner of Lotte Lenya-Weill had for private reasons gone to the USA already before 1938, was faced with a fait accompli and had to adapt to the present circumstances. It was still in the last days of war that the former chairman of the Vienna Philharmonic, the contrabassist Wilhelm Jerger, who also was a member of the SS and the Ahnenerbe\(^8\), made his position available.\(^9\) According to Philharmonic member Otto Strasser, who already in 1938 had played a central part in the transition of power, there were secret talks with Furtwängler\(^10\) months before the end of the war, in order to quickly conduct the imminent internal “transition of power.” Jerger had in 1938 assumed the leading position from Hugo Burghauser, who after the “annexation” as sympathizer of the Fatherland’s Front and as “Jewish kin” (jüdisch versippt) was declared politically unsustainable and later had to withdraw from the State Opera orchestra.\(^11\)

The successor to Jerger, Fritz Sedlak, was successful in holding the orchestra together and bringing it safely through the final turmoil of war. Due to his knowledge of Russian, which he had acquired as prisoner during the First World War, he could lead the talks with Soviet occupation officers himself.\(^12\)

The Soviet cultural policy was entirely oriented towards an immediate resumption of cultural life, and therefore it was not difficult for him to win many a help for his orchestra, which under Clemens Krauss and Robert Fanta and without extensive denazification again gave its first concerts.\(^13\)

The denazification measures themselves were kept within limits, because Sedlak – a politically integer man – successfully intervened at the State Secretary for National Edification, Schooling and Education as well as Religious Affairs in the provisional state government.

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\(^8\) Bundesarchiv Berlin, formerly Berlin Document Center, personal file Jerger, Wilhelm.


\(^10\) Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv, National Socialist registration, Otto Strasser; the original writing of Furtwängler, which confirms this information by Strasser, is unfortunately no longer enclosed, but it is however quoted in the file.


\(^12\) Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 218.

\(^13\) Erwin Mittag, Aus der Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker, Wien 1950, 96 ff.
Renner, Ernst Fischer, a communist official who had returned from Moscow; he unreservedly took a stand for the conservation of this unique orchestra.”\textsuperscript{14} Formal NSDAP party membership alone should not be reason for a discharge. An internal “denazification commission”, next to ministry officials, was staffed also by a Philharmonic,\textsuperscript{15} and this orchestral member was one of those “rescued half breeds and Jewish kin” who in 1938 was spared discharge after Furtwängler’s intervention.\textsuperscript{16} During a press conference in April 1946, Sedlak attempted to justify the fact that discharges or retirements of party members in the orchestra were only handled reservedly.\textsuperscript{17} After the end of war, four heavily charged musicians were immediately discharged – two men of the SS, an illegal, and allegedly a former Blockwart-helper.\textsuperscript{18} 14 further orchestral members were retired – in which were included also some not National Socialist.

Rudolf Kalmar, local head of the all-party newspaper \textit{Neues Österreich}, who had survived the concentration camps Dachau and Flossenbürg, took Sedlak’s press conference as an occasion to plead for a milder persecution of former National Socialists, using the example of the Philharmonic.\textsuperscript{19} In an editorial article, he reckoned that the orchestra has to be conceded a higher degree of “world-erness” (\textit{Weltfremdheit}) and that an example has to be set, which should constitute an “open and resolute confession of one’s own error of yesterday” and could also amount to a justification of a sort in front of the abroad countries. At this press conference, Fritz Sedlak had given the legality declaration to federal president Renner\textsuperscript{20}, condemned the past with harsh words, and announced concerts, the net yield of which should flow back to the relatives of those earlier orchestral colleagues who after 1938 had fallen victim to National Socialism.

Up to this point, the two great occupying powers deliberately practiced restrain in this issue. The chief editor of the \textit{Wiener Kurier}, Hendric J. Burns\textsuperscript{21}, as well as the Austriacus in the \textit{Österreichische Zeitung}\textsuperscript{22} reckoned that a temporarily less well-equipped orchestra would be

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\textsuperscript{14} Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 222; Ernst Fischer, Das Ende einer Illusion. Erinnerungen 1945 – 1955, 138.
\textsuperscript{15} Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 222.
\textsuperscript{16} This would have probably been the trombone player Professor Josef Hadraba (Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 222, in connection with NA-RG 260/95/Folder: Music & Theater, Furtwängler to Kerber, August 20, 1938, and BW Zl. 2647/1945, supplement).
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Wiener Kurier}, March 9, 1946, 2; \textit{Österreichische Zeitung}, March 12, 1946, 6.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.; the later executive editor of the \textit{Neuen Österreich} could convincingly communicate such serious and conciliatory statements, because he had been incarcerated in the concentration camps Dachau and Flossenbürg from 1938 to 1945 (in this respect cf. Rudolf Kalmar, Zeit ohne Gnade, Wien 1946).
\textsuperscript{20} Rudolf Kalmar, Die Philharmoniker, in: \textit{Neues Österreich}, March 7, 1946, 2. The legality declaration read: “... all members wholeheartedly confess themselves to the new Austria, utterly disaffirm the past, and also are at any time willing to confirm this confession in deeds.”; (BW Zl. 1246/1946).
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Wiener Kurier}, March 9, 1946, 2.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Österreichische Zeitung}, March 12, 1946, 6.
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much more in line with the tradition of the Vienna Philharmonic. Protest from within the ranks of the Philharmonic reached to the address of the US theatre officer, Henry C. Alters, a Viennese emigrant who at that time was solely responsible for theatre and music in Vienna, because the pianist and music officer Margot Pinter had left the Information Services Branch (ISB).\footnote{NA-RG 260/892/Folder: Music & Theatre Reports 1945–47, Alter an Theatre and Music Officer – Semi-Monthly Report No. 9, April 15, 1946, 2ff.} Mrs. Pinter had been completely in line with Sedlak, because she herself as pianist placed the issue of the performative quality far above the issue of the political responsibility of the musicians.\footnote{Communication of Professor Margot Voigt-Pinter to the author, July 28, 1979. Anton Voigt, Nicht Richter, sondern Helfer. Die Pianistin Margot Pinter als Cultural Officer der amerikanischen Militärverwaltung. Zur „Entnazifizierung von Musik“; in: „Kulturhauptstadt des Führers“. Kunst und Nationalsozialismus in Linz und Oberösterreich. Ein Projekt der Oberösterreichischen Landesmuseen in Kooperation mit Linz 2009 Kulturhauptstadt Europas. [Zur Ausstellung im Schlossmuseum Linz 17.9.2008 bis 22.3.2009] (Kataloge der Oberösterreichischen Landesmuseen Neue Serie 78), 261–268.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, she did not attach great importance to the formal party membership or candidature, with the rational that musicians were deeply apolitical people. She was furthermore incapable of compensating an additional emotional handicap: She had already performed with the Philharmonic in Vienna and suddenly saw herself being pressed into the role of a judge of denazification, who – at least according to the views of general McChryystal – was supposed to discharge as many party members as possible and maintain but a rudimentary orchestration with only the most important instruments.\footnote{Ibid.}

The six musicians who had complained towards Alter revealed a certain weakness in the numeral reasoning of Sedlak, because out of the total of 14 retired colleagues, four were permanently retired not due to their party membership, but due to their age; another group of six artists should have been retired years ago, but precisely because of their membership in the NSDAP could retain their position in the orchestra.\footnote{NA-RG 260/892/Folder: Music & Theater Reports 1945–47, Alter an Theater and Music Officer – Semi-Monthly Report No. 9, 15. April 1946, 2} Doubts were raised also towards the claim of the provisional chairman that insufficient other musicians of suitable artistic skills were available.\footnote{Ibid., 3. While already in the summer of 1945 in the course of a temporary consolidation of the orchestras of the State Opera and the Volksoper also other musicians had successfully performed together with the Philharmonists, these were then again discharged as soon as a sufficient number of “old” Philharmonists were available, who partially were politically charged.}

The discussion concerning the Philharmonic fell silent during the following months due to the Salzburg Festival and because the denazification of Karajan and Furtwängler was prioritised. The Philharmonic did indeed perform at the Salzburg Festival, but three charged orchestral members were denied solo performance by US cultural affairs officer Ernst Lothar,
who had returned from exile.\footnote{NA-RG 260/892/Folder: Music & Theater Reports 1945–47, Lothar to Chief, ISB Semi-Monthly Report, August 15, 1946, 3.} A repeated review of this music ensemble on the level of the Allied Denazification Bureau of the Allied Commission started in September. The American representative of this council, Maximilian Wallach, put forward the publicly voiced concerns about the Nazi members in the orchestra and demanded a meeting with the responsible Austrians, because it had so far been impossible to receive detailed documents from them.\footnote{NA-RG 260/547/7, Hefti – Record of Work, September 27, 1946.}

Occasion for this investigation was a planned abroad trip of the Philharmonic; in the issuance of “travel permits,” the attention of French offices was again called to the political past of individual Philharmonic members. At the conference of members of the Allied Denazification Bureau and representatives of the Federal Ministry of Education as well as the Federal Theatre Administration, it was especially the head of the Federal Theatre Administration, Egon Hilbert, detained as political prisoner in the KZ-Dachau from 1938 to 1945, who wanted to substantiate the view of the former state secretary Fischer that artists are to be judged by different criteria in terms of politics.\footnote{NA-RG 260/44/29, Wallach – Record of work, October 3, 1945, 1.} Furthermore, efforts would have shown that it was impossible to find appropriate substitutions. In response to the specific question about the exact number of former National Socialists in the orchestra, Hilbert responded: “… out of 133 members of the State Opera, 45 are former party members, and 13 former party members had been excluded from the Philharmonic Orchestra, including the ones who resigned, and the ones who had been pensioned with a reduction of pay.”\footnote{Ibid.} Towards the end of the briefing, the representative of the Ministry of Education admitted that the Philharmonic Orchestra was the only institution in his ministry’s responsibility in which “illegals” were employed.\footnote{Ibid., 3.} In further consequence, the Allied Denazification Bureau demanded a more intense cooperation and further information in the form of questionnaires.

The charged members of the orchestra could not be taken on a tour to France and Switzerland, because they had not received travel permits. Substitutes took their place, and despite these improvisations the guest performances were conducted without any damage to the orchestra’s image.\footnote{Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 234.} In this case, as in other cultural denazification measures, the Information Services Branch had lost its decisive function and was only approached as a consultant. Concerning the stage ban of “illegal” ensemble members, there was principally no discussion between the Special Branch and the Information Services Branch.\footnote{NA-RG 260/547/7, Joint Minutes of the Denazification Bureau and Quadripartite Press and Entertainment Sub-Committee, December 19, 1946.} It was especially in the USA that the high rate of former National Socialists in the ranks of the
Vienna Philharmonic was criticised. Also the world-famous solo violinist, Bronislaw Hubermann, declared not to come to Vienna “before the last Nazi has disappeared from Viennese musical life.”

Illegal musicians (i.e. those who were NSDAP-members during the party ban 1933-1938) should originally be immediately discharged, according to the beliefs of all members in the Allied Denazification Bureau – without regard of their artistic irreplaceability in view of the entire orchestra. To this group of “illegals” were counted also those Nazi party members who had faked allied questionnaires and concealed their political past. For this reason, the US-representative in the Allied Denazification Bureau prompted the ISB Information Service Branch to at first submit their “technical opinion” on only 23 “less incriminated” (minder belastet) orchestral members. For the time being, he did not want to discuss the case of the 28 musicians who were to be immediately discharged. This stance however was opposed by the British cultural officer and Austrian political emigrant, Peter Schnabel. He requested that the Vienna Philharmonic should be preserved in their entirety and that only two to three politically unacceptable artists should be discharged – thereby he was fully in line with the official Austrian standpoint. Moreover, he pointed to the new National Socialist law (Nationalsozialistenverbotsgesetz) which would come into effect two months later and provide new guidelines and legal possibilities to the Austrians.

A further delay was declined in the joint meeting of the Denazification Bureau and the Quadripartite Press and Entertainment Sub-Committee primarily by the Soviet representative Aristowa, but also by the French and Americans. A total number of 23 cases came up for discussion, and the ISB-representative Albert van Eerden began with an extensive statement about concertmaster Wolfgang Scheiderhan, whom he described as a „never more than lukewarm member of the Nazi party;“ an unanimous positive decision was subsequently achieved. In 13 further cases, all cultural and denazification officers voted for a stage permission. Only twice was a discharge decided upon unanimously, whereas the Austrians had in their documents denied political acceptability only in the case of a violinist. The US

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35 Wiener Kurier, September 13, 1946, 4.
36 Österreichische Zeitung, March 12, 1946, 6.
39 Peter Schnabel fled to Great Britain in 1938, because as former battalion commander in the Heimwehr he feared political restrictions by the National Socialists. After the outbreak of the Second World War, he joined the British army and was in 1945 deployed as information officer in Hannover und Düsseldorf. In 1946 he returned to Austria on his own terms. (Communication by Major a. D. Peter Schnabel to the author, May 20, 1981.)
40 NA-RG 260/54/7, Joint Minutes of the Denazification Bureau and Quadripartite Press and Entertainment Sub-Committee, December 19, 1946, 1f.
41 Ibid., 3.
42 Ibid., 3ff.
denazification officer abided closely by the recommendations of van Eerden, who had taken over the responsibility of the denazification of the Philharmonic from Ernst Lothar; only in two cases the Americans voted for the removal of charged musicians, and in two further ones no judgement could be delivered concerning the “substitutability” for a lack of documents. In the case of six musicians, the Soviet representatives, lieutenant Shour for the Denazification Department and Miss Aristowa for the Soviet Information Service, demanded a discharge without immediate discharge, and only once the French and the Soviets agreed on a veto.

In this debate, the alteration in the Soviet denazification policy in cultural issues is clearly illustrated. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, conductor Josef Krips, who for racial reasons was imposed with a stage ban during the Nazi era, was ultimately prompted by the cultural officers of the Red Army to perform with the entire orchestra of the Vienna Philharmonic – including those members charged with National Socialism.

While the Western Allies agreed that only a gradual denazification of the orchestra was possible – a point on which most emphasis was placed by the Americans – the Soviet representative in the Sub-Committee for Press and Entertainment meant that an immediate discharge should follow also in the case of those unacceptable and “less incriminated”.

Already a month later however, the Allied Denazification Bureau was forced to ask for an expert opinion from the ISB Information Service Branch also on those illegals immediately to be discharged. 19 were denoted as artistically irreplaceable, while in the case of the remaining nine musicians a replacement could be found on short notice. In the view of the State Theatre Administration and the Representation of the State Opera Orchestra however, all 28 were irreplaceable. Even though the Allied Denazification Office of the department 2N in the Office of the Federal Chancellor had in June 1947 conveyed a definite list of the 28 members of the State Opera and Philharmonic Orchestra to be immediately discharged, a corresponding reaction on the side of the Austrians remained absent.

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47 Ibid., Annex A.
48 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik, BKA-Verbindungsstelle, Zl. 2153/XXXIII.
Characteristic, although possibly not deliberately planned, was the Philharmonic's first big post-war tour to Great Britain, whose representatives in the Cultural Department as well as in the Foreign Office had already very early on argued in support of an omission of the denazification in order to preserve the homogeneity of the orchestra.

The US-experts could not assert themselves in any stage, because the Soviets themselves, who until the involvement of the Western Allies in the administration of Vienna were completely in line with their idea of cultural reconciliation, had taken almost no denazification measures and in the suspension of legal regulations showed great leniency towards the relevant Austrian authorities. The Americans did attempt to revise this fait accompli on the level of the Allied Commission, but the Austrians had already established their position to such an extent that even a joint decision of the Allies to discharge the "illegal" Philharmonic could not have change the situation.

According to the views of the author, it is inaccurate to denote the factual sacrifice of the Vienna Philharmonic's denazification as an unintended failure of the US cultural denazification policy, which in 1945/46 was oriented solely towards individual cases. On the one hand, it was only in 1946/47 that the discussion of the political assessment of the orchestra was held in specific terms on an Allied level, on the other hand, in the eyes of the US cultural officers the Philharmonic represented a primarily cultural instrument of international importance. Within the Information Services Branch and in the USA, there had however also been discussions about whether the retention of such a high number of party members would not damage the orchestra. In the end, a formal Allied Resolution was passed in 1947 to discharge a majority of the illegals, in practice though enforcement against Austrian resistance was eschewed.

The priorities were redefined after in January 1947 52% of the respondents in an American opinion survey in Vienna spoke out in favour for the retention of the orchestra in its "nazified" form. The Americans and the Allies obviously wanted to avoid a scandal in this issue, which by no means was any longer amongst the main concerns of the occupation administration – not least because the Austrians, despite not knowing the Philharmonic personally, perceived the denazification of the orchestra as an allied intervention and violation of national pride.

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49 Strasser, Und dafür wird man noch bezahlt, 236.
50 Dieter Stiefel, Entnazifizierung, 275.
51 Anna J. and Richard L. Merritt (Hg.), Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949. With a Foreword by Frederick W. Williams, Urbana/Chicago/London: University of Illinois Press 1970, 129f.; it is especially interesting that the musical connoisseurs of the Vienna Philharmonists took a much stronger stance for a denazification of the orchestra.
How inaccurate the specific “denazification” could ultimately be – initially also due to a lack of appropriate NSDAP-documents, such as the SS-records of Wilhelm Jerger and Helmut Wobisch, for example – is exemplified by the special case of Franz Bartolomey. Was he a “top-Nazi,” like Wilhelm Jerger, the chairman of the orchestra, Helmut Wobisch and Adolf Löfler, since he was discharged together with these colleagues immediately after the liberation in 1945? In recent years, a new source in the Vienna City and State Archive on the denazification procedures has become available, i.e. those procedures which decided whether an illegal membership existed during the party ban of the NSDAP 1933-1938. Furthermore, the various denazification commissions decided upon active and passive voting rights as well as in the professional domain in the case of officials upon discharge and retirement or suspension and atonement payments. Advanced and enhanced by means of documents from Bartolomey’s correspondence provided to me by his son, suddenly a completely different picture emerged.

Even though Bartolomey – and this is an important difference to all of the other re-integrated former NSDAP-members – had been excluded from the NSDAP in 1942, some colleagues in the orchestra made use of his absence towards the end of the war to talk him up as “top-Nazi,” which surely was not the case. He was indeed German-nationally socialized in the context of the Gymnastics Club (Turnverein) and the Youth League (Jugendbund), but, as compared to 36% of the orchestral members, he was not active for the NSDAP already before the “annexation” in 1938. He was engaged as a substitute already in 1937 and in 1938 profited from the racially motivated discharges – amongst them eleven string players who as Jews were excluded and discharged. As early as May/June 1938, he should succeed in an audition in which out of 97 applicants seven string players were engaged for the State Opera, and already in July he requested the NSDAP-membership. On November 4, 1939 he was with retroactive effect of November 1, 1938 accepted in the Association of the Vienna Philharmonic. This contract of 1938 also meant for Bartolomey an end to his great existential anxiety, which had haunted him since the death of his father in 1920. He joined the NSDAP already in 1938, but for the time being was accepted only as party candidate and on June 1, 1940 received the membership number 7.676.908. In 1942 however, he was excluded due to being denounced for having engaged a painter who was married to a Jewish woman.

What was lacking in the case of Franz Bartolomey II. though was the “air-raid shelter experience” of the last days of war, because after an approved holiday he stayed on with his family and was suddenly branded a quitter and outsider. Obviously some decision makers in 1945 were quite happy to find former NSDAP-members who – without a chance to react – could quickly be excluded in order to signalize a symbolic denazification. In the end, it also

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turned out to be a group of former hardcore-Nazis who almost managed to prevent his return. The “case Bartolomey” demonstrates how complex group-dynamic processes affected the denazification policy especially in the case of the State Opera orchestra or the Vienna Philharmonic, and how great Nazis could be created from followers (Mitleufer), and vice versa.

At least, Helmut Wobisch was in 1953 appointed manager of the Vienna Philharmonic and kept this position until 1969. I have described Wobisch’s case in detail in my contribution on the honours. In his – tumultuous – election as manager in 1953, he was actually not entitled to actively vote, because he had still not been amnestyed by the federal president from the “atonement consequences” of his participation in the attempted coup d’état in July 1934. In an express procedure, this amnesty was then made up for, whereby in contortion of the facts Wobisch’s past was interpreted completely on the contrary.

Wilhelm Jerger, on the other hand, escaped a trial for illegality in front of the People’s Court (Volksgericht), because he was in US-custody in Glasingen. His intended denazification procedure for a possible return to the State Opera orchestra and thereby also to the Vienna Philharmonic is especially interesting and not yet extensively evaluated, but this will first have to be analyzed on the basis of other source materials. While Jerger’s role was rudimentarily addressed by Clemens Hellsberg in his book Demokratie der Könige (1992) – the account of which was taken note of with partial displeasure by his son, Veit Jerger – the Anton Bruckner Private University, the former Bruckner-Conservatory, needed until the year 2009 to attend to the question of Jerger’s past, even though he had acted as its director from 1958-1973. And yet, as can by seen by the contributions to this project of Bernadette Mayrhofer and myself, such a pursuit would have yielded quite an ambivalent picture.

Jerger was appointed director of the Bruckner-Conservatory on August 15, 1958, after he had gone to Switzerland in 1948 and started to establish himself a second life as musicologist. According to Jerger’s son, there had supposedly also been accusations about his father’s Nazi-past at the time of his appointment, which however were invalidated by Simon Wiesenthal. Incidentally, Wilhelm Jerger later received the Franz-Schalk-Medal in silver from

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53 Telephone information by Dr. Winfried Garscha, DÖW, on the basis of his research files (March 5, 2013).
54 In this respect, cf. the corresponding clues in the Archive of the Vienna Philharmonists, Depot State Opera, folder Jerger. Statements concerning his conduct during the Nazi era were also accessed.
55 Diary, Veit Jerger (written before 2006), 9. I am thankful to Miss Saskia Kuhlmann for providing me with excerpts of the diary.
57 Diary, Veit Jerger, 10.
the Vienna Philharmonic. Also in this case it would be important to investigate the circumstances of this bestowal.

Taken as a whole, the single cases that here were only briefly outlined document the fact that it is absolutely necessary to consult a wide range of sources in an assessment of the behaviour of single orchestral members. A first evaluation of the initially mentioned documents from the Nazi era in various Viennese archives, corresponding denazification documents, and files from the State Archive in Berlin allow for a clearer appraisal, which however includes all the possibilities of political behaviour and which can ultimately only be achieved with academic accuracy by case studies such as the ones on Franz Bartolomey or Wilhelm Jerger as well as Helmut Wobisch.

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